Cleveland State University

EngagedScholarship@CSU
1995-2002 Court Filings

2000 Trial

4-6-2000

Memorandum Opinion Regarding Further Admission of Evidence
of the Durkin Homicide
Judge Ronald Suster
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas

Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/
sheppard_court_filings_2000

How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
Recommended Citation
Suster, Judge Ronald, "Memorandum Opinion Regarding Further Admission of Evidence of the Durkin
Homicide" (2000). 1995-2002 Court Filings. 133.
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/sheppard_court_filings_2000/133

This Davis v. State of Ohio, Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Case No. CV96-312322 is brought to you for free and
open access by the 2000 Trial at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in 1995-2002 Court
Filings by an authorized administrator of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact
library.es@csuohio.edu.

STATE OF OHIO

)

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

CUYAHOGA COUNTY

) SS:
)

CASE NO. 312322

ALAN DAVIS, et al.,
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vs.
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)
)
)
)
)
)
)

MEMORANDUM OPINION
REGARDING FURTHER ADMISSION
OF EVIDENCE OF THE
DURKIN HOMICIDE

Ronald Suster, J.
Plaintiff seeks to admit evidence of the Durkin homicide beyond what has already been
offered for two purposes: primarily, Plaintiff contends that there are sufficient similarities between
the Durkin and Sheppard homicides to cause the Durkin homicide to be admissible as proof of
Richard Eberling' s identity as the killer of Mrs. Sheppard. For the reasons set forth below, the State
of Oho's motion in limine to limit further evidence of the Durkin homicide is GRANTED.

Evidence of the Durkin Homicide as Proof of Eberling's
"Identity" as the Sheppard Killer 1
After consideration of Plaintiffs detailed proffer, the Court is not persuaded that the Durkin
homicide is admissible as proof of "identity" (commonly known as "modus operandi") under R.
Evid. 404(B). The similarities between the two homicides are not sufficiently distinctive to cause
me to admit this evidence under rule 404(b). State v. Bey, 85 Oh. St. 3d 487; State v. Lowe, 69 Oh.
St. 3d 527. In the end, the Durkin homicide, while it may show that Eberling is the type of person
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The Court previously announced this aspect of its opinion from the bench.
1

who would kill Ms. Sheppard, does not show that Eberling is the person who killed Ms. Sheppard.
This is the distinction which the Lowe case makes between that which is and which is not admissible
under rule 404(b ).
Evidence of Eberling's Statements to Ms. Scheidler Concerning the Durkin Homicide 2

This leads to the closer question of Plaintiffs alternative argument, that evidence of
Eberling's conversation with Ms. Scheidler, in which he admitted killing Ms. Durkin, should be
admitted as an "other act" of Eberling to show that, when drinking and making admissions
concerning the commission of a homicide (or any other serious crime for that matter), Eberling has
been truthful in the past. Plaintiff contends that this is probative of whether Eberling was truthful
when he confessed to Dyal under similar circumstances. Plaintiff contends that this is a noncharacter use of evidence ofEberling's other acts. Plaintiff contends that this evidence shows the
absence of fabrication on the part of Eberling which plaintiff contends would be a non-character use
akin to "the absence of mistake" or "identity" explicitly recognized under rule 404(b ).
The starting point for analyzing Plaintiffs argument is Evid. R. 806, which provides that a
hearsay declarant's credibility may be supported or attacked as ifthe declarant were testifying from
the witness stand in the case sub Judice. Thus, the issue becomes whether, if Eberling had appeared
in court and testified that he killed Marilyn Sheppard, his statement to Scheidler could be admitted
for the limited purpose of supporting his credibility. Evid. R. 404(A)(3) states that a witness'
character for credibility should be evaluated pursuant to Rules 607, 608 and 609. Here, because the
issue is one of specific instances of conduct affecting credibility, Rule 608 is operative.
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The Court previously advised all counsel informally of this ruling; the within
Memorandum Opinion places this ruling on the record.
2

A witness' credibility may not be supported unless and until it has been attacked. Evid. R.
608(A).

3

Under Evid. R. 608(B), prior instances of truthfulness offered to support a witness'

truthful character must be "clearly probative of truthfulness." The circumstances of Eberling's
confession to Scheidler are not clearly probative of a truthful character. Scheidler was an accomplice
in the fraudulent scheme. As an accomplice, Eberling had reason to believe that Scheidler would
not disclose his statements to anyone. Accordingly, the fact that he would speak freely and truthfully
to an accomplice does not mean he is necessarily of truthful character. Second, Ms. Scheidler' s
status as an accomplice aside, the circumstances of having truthfully confessed to murder on one
occasion when speaking with a young woman over drinks, as is the case with Eberling's comments
to Scheidler, does not clearly tend to show that he is a person of truthful character.
Because this is an issue of specific instances of conduct affecting a witness' credibility, the
Court looks to rule 608(B) and not to Rule 404(B). In essence, Plaintiffs argument, while couched
in terms of Rule 404(B)'s "absence of mistake" or "identity" necessarily boils down to a question
of whether Eberling' s honest confession about the Durkin homicide is probative of his honesty when
confessing to the Sheppard homicide. Accordingly, Rule 608(B) is the controlling rule of evidence.

3

The Court notes that the State of Ohio, which would be most likely to attack Eberling' s
credibility, has done so to a very limited extent. There were some questions put to the witness Dyal
about Eberling's prior thefts. Neither party has requested that the jury be allowed to consider the
Eberling murder conviction in weighing his credibility as a hearsay declarant -- the State of Ohio has
only sought to have the murder conviction considered for the much narrower purpose of explaining
Dyal's timing in reporting Eberling's statements to the police. The State's main attack has been on
the witness Dyal' s credibility as the person who has related Eberling' s hearsay statement to the jury
- the State has not chosen to focus its attack on Eberling, the purported hearsay declarant.
Because there has been some attack on Eberling's credibility, the Court will address whether
Plaintiffs proffered evidence is an appropriate attempt to support Eberling's credibility.

3

Even if the Court were to evaluate this matter under a Rule 404(B) analysis, there is nothing
so distinctive about these conversations to tend to say that, as a matter of identity, proof of one
truthful statement shows proof that the other is truthful. Similarly, the Court is not persuaded that
proof of one truthful statement shows the absence of fabrication on the other occasion, or to say that
proof of one truthful statement establishes a pattern of truthfulness. The fact that Eberling has
truthfully admitted to killing Ms. Durkin in a discussion over drinks with his younger female
accomplice Ms. Scheidler does not mean that he was truthful when he told his younger female friend
Ms. Dyal that he killed Ms. Sheppard. Moreover, the lapse in time between the time of the murder
and the time of the confession is dissimilar between the confession to Scheidler, which was to a
relatively recent murder, and the alleged confession to Dyal, which was to a murder long since
committed.
For the foregoing reasons, the motion in limine is

4

